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The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on the exercise of 
agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how 
agents make sense of their actions also allows us to identify a distinctive space for assessing 
individual responsibility within the context of collective actions, which so far has remained 
underexplored. We concentrate as a case in point on reason-giving that occurs when individuals 
engage in necessarily less-than-successful rationalisations of their involvement in a shared practice, 
like systemic corruption.  
 
In §2, we argue that systemic corruption is best understood in terms of its public ¶unavowability·.  
In particular, we focus on the redescriptions to which officeholders who partake in systemic 
corruption typically resort to vindicate their actions when they present, say, familism as a matter 
of trust or when they coat bribes in the terminology of tokens of appreciation for services 
rendered. To show that these redescriptions are indicative of the LQGLYLGXDO RIILFHKROGHUV·
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rationalisations constitutive of systemic corruption, we develop in §3 a multidimensional approach 
to reason-giving. On this approach, reason-giving is less-than-successful when different categories 
of reasons involved in making VHQVH RI RQH·V own conduct are misaligned. We show, on this 
ground, the necessarily less-than-successful character of individual rationalisations in 
circumstances of systemic corruption and qualify the kind of tainted reasoning (at the interface 
between epistemic vice and epistemic disadvantage) thus produced with reference to such test 
cases as self-GHFHSWLRQZLOIXOLJQRUDQFHDQGDFWLRQVRQ¶DXWRSLORW·. 
 
In §4, we expound the new view of responsibility emerging from our analysis of individual 
rationalisations in cases of systemic corruption. Notably, we argue that reason-giving is the 
epistemic core which responsibility assessments track. To demonstrate the interest of this 
emerging view, we compare its nature and scope with that of existing alternatives: responsibility as 
accountability and responsibility as attributability.  We conclude in §5, by showing how our reason-
giving-based understanding of responsibility can shed new light on the analysis and normative 
DVVHVVPHQWRIDQDJHQW·Vresponsible ignorance. 
 
2. Systemic Corruption  
 
Corruption is a term with a strong, yet elusive pre-theoretical appeal. When an officeholder is 
accused of corruption, this accusation often involves the claim that he used his power of office 
for his personal gain (Philp 1997). Or, else, he might be called out for revealing a negative character 
trait, a kind of personal vice that insidiously degrades the institution in whose name he acts (Miller 
2017). Finally, the attribute ¶FRUUXSW·PLJKWEHXVHGORRVHO\WRLQGLFDWHWKHODFNRIWUXVWZKHWKHU
warranted or not, in DQRIILFHKROGHU·VSURIHVVLRQDOintegrity (Ceva and Ferretti 2018). In a similar 
YHLQZKHQDQLQVWLWXWLRQLVGHVFULEHGDV¶FRUUXSW·WKLVdescription might indicate a sense that self-
serving behaviours are widespread among institutional role-occupants (Miller 2017), or that the 
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institution as a whole has lost sight of its original purpose (Lessig 2013; Thompson 2005). When 
used in this latter sense, corruption might also be meant to ascribe extensive dysfunctionality to 
the workings of an institution (Ferretti 2018; Thompson 2018). Finally, by calling an institution 
¶FRUUXSW· RQH PLJKW EH UHIHUULQJ WR D heterogeneous range of negative institutional features 
including inefficiency, illegitimacy, or simply the condition of being harmful to society.1  
 
The following discussion is not intended to provide a comprehensive theory of corruption to make 
sense of the variety of cases just outlined. The ambition instead is to demarcate a distinctive 
phenomenon of corruption as a case in point to observe the role of reason-giving as the ultimate 
ground for responsibility assessments. One of the main advantages of this focus is that it allows 
discussing responsibility assessments that bring into sharp relief the interconnectedness between 
individual conduct and institutional features. This is an important characteristic of our approach 
because it allows us offsetting the intuitive, though misleading, appeal of conceiving responsibility 
as fractional or diminished in virtue of being shared by multiple agents. 2 
 
The specific phenomenon of corruption in which we are interested for the general purpose of our 
paper can go under the heading of ¶V\VWHPLF FRUUXSWLRQ· ¶6\VWHPLF· KHUH UHIHUV WR VHYHUDO
constitutive features. The relevant kind of corruption (1) is sustained and continued over time, (2) 
involves the participation, whether conscious or not, of multiple agents, and (3) takes the form of 
an identifiable institutional practice, (4) thus implying some degree of coordination among the 
participants. It becomes apparent that the systemic practice we are interested in amounts to 
corruption proper rather than, say, institutional change or decay once we consider a further 
FRQVWLWXWLYH IHDWXUH RI ¶FRUUXSWLRQ· ZKLOH LGHQWLILDEOH RQ UHIOHFWLRQ FRUUXSWLRQ LV VWLOO 
                                                          
1 )RUDFULWLFDORYHUYLHZRIWKHPDQ\VHQVHRI¶FRUUXSWLRQ·VHH&HYDDQG)HUUHWWL 
2 This is what Dennis Thompson (2017), among others, KDVFDOOHG¶WKHPDQ\KDQGVSUREOHP· 
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fundamentally publicly unavowable as a practice. This feature indicates that the rationale of the 
agenda an officeholder pursues in her institutional capacity through the use of the power entrusted 
to her office may not be publicly vindicated by reference to the terms³the letter or the spirit³of 
that power mandate.  
 
Putting these features together we can say that systemic corruption occurs when the mechanisms 
according to which some powers of office are predictably exercised within a legitimate rule-based 
organisation regularly operate on a rationale incoherent with the terms of the mandate with which 
those powers are entrusted to some organisational roles (Ceva 2018). This incoherence makes such 
uses of power unfit for withstanding public scrutiny. On this understanding, not all instances of 
ZLGHVSUHDGFRUUXSWLRQZRXOGTXDOLI\DV ¶V\VWHPLF·1RUZRXOGLQGLYLGXDORIILFLDOVEHQHFHVVDULO\
implicated in systemic corruption in virtue of their being personally and repeatedly untrustworthy 
in the performance of their institutional roles. Similarly, some institutions that are correctly 
described as failing or dysfunctional overall would nevertheless fall outside the scope of systemic 
corruption.  
 
Systemic corruption includes such straightforward cases as routine bribery in the selection of 
contractors for public works and clientelism in the provision of public services, as well as patronage 
and state capture. To see what these practices share, consider that an institution is standardly 
understood as a system of interdependent embodied roles (the offices).3 In public institutions, like 
in any other legitimate rule-based organization, public rules govern the exercise of the powers 
entrusted to the various institutional roles. However, a measure of discretion is generally allowed 
concerning how precisely those who hold a particular office may decide to perform the functions 
                                                          
3 See Emmet 1966. This characterisation encompasses both teleological (purpose-driven) and deontological (reason-
driven) approaches to institutional theory ² for an overview, see Miller 2014. 
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mandated to them. Moreover, we should expect some significant margins for (reasonable) 
disagreement among officeholders on the interpretations of their respective mandates and how 
they think is best to realize them. These predicaments suggest that the terms of a power mandate 
are likely to be contested. Nonetheless, we can also see that³in a legitimate (e.g., not criminal, like 
the Mafia) institutional system³there is a certain degree of social confidence that public officials 
exercise their entrusted powers in ways that are coherent with the letter as well as the spirit of their 
power mandate.4 What it more, officeholders are generally expected to be capable of vindicating 
the rationale of their actions ¶SXEOLFO\·in terms that show such coherence.  
 
Depending on the kind of power and the nature of the institution at stake (e.g., whether it is 
democratic), the community towards whom officeholders are expected to vindicate the rationale 
of their conduct may vary, to include³at the very least³their fellow members of an organization 
or even the citizenry (in the case of democratic institutions). But, regardless of how we specify this 
feature, we want to emphasize that institutional role-occupants must act in ways that enable them 
to show the coherence of the rationale of their agenda with the commonly known terms of their 
power mandate. This is an expectation that applies to all officeholders within a legitimate rule-
based system, even if the case of their having to withstand actual public scrutiny is an eventuality 
that might never occur.  
 
When officeholders fail to use their power of office in a way that may withstand public scrutiny in 
keeping with the terms of that power mandate, we say that their action is fundamentally publicly 
unavowable in the sense that it is corrupt (Ceva 2018; Ceva and Ferretti 2018; Miller 2017). Publicly 
                                                          
4 This is a standard claim in institutional theory. For example, in the field of professional ethics, see Emmett 1966 
and, in legal theory, Winston 1999. For a broader discussion, see Applbaum 1999. For the Kantian interpretation of 
RIILFHKROGHUV·DFWLRQRQPDQGDWHVHH5LSVWHLQ 
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unavowable uses of entrusted powers of office may well be sporadic and circumstantial. This could 
be the case of a newly elected politician who uses her power of office to hire her husband as her 
chief of staff. But they can also be run-of-the-mill and widely predictable. Systemic corruption 
refers to such publicly unavowable uses of power within the context of a regular and sustained 
institutional practice. 
 
By pointing to the unavowable character of systemic corruption as a practice we can make sense 
of the structural role played by the typical operations of redescription through which the 
officeholders involved in a systemically corrupt institutional practice try to vindicate the rationale 
of their actions. While the UDWLRQDOHRIVRPHRIILFHKROGHUV·professional conduct is incoherent with 
the terms of their power mandate, those officeholders are characteristically ready to pay lip service 
to their institutional role. So, typically, they would describe bribes as tokens of professional 
gratitude, clientelism as services rendered, and familism as a matter of trust with beneficial 
efficiency-enhancing effects on the performance of their functions (see Ceva 2018). This feature 
has persuaded some commentators to present corruption as characteristically covert. Mark Warren 
(2004: 333; 2006: 804), for example, argues that corrupt officeholders are symptomatically 
hypocritical in their formally upholding the norms of democracy, while distorting them in action. 
In this sense, for Warren, corruption has to be concealed; were corruption to occur in the open, 
its inherent ¶hypocrisy· would be revealed in a way that is not sustainable for the parties involved. 
 
While the covertness of systemic corruption is empirically accurate in many instances, we do not 
take it to be (either logically or empirically) definitive of the practice as its unavowable character 
is. For example, many commentators refer to the practice of private electoral campaign financing 
as a textbook example of systemic corruption. In such countries as the United States this practice 
is legal and, thus, carried out in the open. However, we could consider it corrupt only to the extent 
that it makes the mandate of elected politicians dependent on partisan financial powers (Lessig 
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2013). Another example comes from those instances of systemic political corruption of which 
everyone is aware, such as systems of patronage in developing democracies. The overt occurrence 
of such practices does not make them any less representative cases of systemic corruption insofar 
as they detract institutional action from the pursuit of shared interests to the exclusive benefit of 
some parties. The definitive point in all such cases is the presence of an agenda with an unavowable 
rationale, a rationale that cannot be publiFO\YLQGLFDWHG LQNHHSLQJZLWKWKHRIILFHKROGHU·VSRZHU
mandate. This is why systemic corruption, irrespective of its being covert or overt, is fundamentally 
publicly unavowable as a practice.  
 
A popular strand in the current philosophical discussion of corruption has focused on systemic 
corruption by emphasizing the institutional dimension of this phenomenon as separate from its 
individual manifestations. Individual corruption occurs when an officeholder deliberately abuses 
her role to obtain a personal benefit (Philp 1997). This benefit might be material, e.g. money in 
cases of embezzlement, or immaterial, e.g. influence in cases of nepotism. But corruption may not 
only be DSURSHUW\RIDQRIILFLDO·V LQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRXU)RU WKH ¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWV· DQDOWRJHWKHU
different kind of corruption may be conceptualised if we look at the properties of institutional 
practices. From this perspective, an institution is corrupt when its constitutive mechanisms 
respond to a logic extraneous to the nature and purpose of that institution so that the very 
functioning of the institution is undermined (Lessig 2013; Miller 2017; Thompson 2005 and 2018). 
 
The typical illustration that institutionalists give of systemic corruption refers to the practice of 
private electoral campaign financing (Thompson 1995). Because in many countries, like the USA, 
this practice is legal, an elected politician whose campaign was financed through the generous 
donations of, say, a gas company is not per se corrupt. However, for the institutionalists, the 
structural relationships of dependence that thus come into being between the elected politician 
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and the private contributor to her campaign corrupt the institution of democratic elections because 
they distort its functioning (Lessig 2013: 2). 
 
In virtue of its focus on the functioning of structural institutional mechanisms, the institutionalist 
approach seems an obvious candidate for making sense of systemic corruption, whereby multiple 
officeholders make a sustained and continual use of some power entrusted to their office on a 
rationale incoherent with that power mandate. This use of power ends up constituting a parallel 
unavowable practice that hijacks the functioning of an institution. On this interpretation, systemic 
corruption is fundamentally institutional DQG LUUHGXFLEOH WR DQ\ RQH RIILFHKROGHU·V LQGLYLGXDO
action, it is WKH¶FRUUXSWLRQRIDV\VWHP· whose mechanisms exhibit the properties of regularity and 
predictability (Lessig 2013: 553; see also Thompson 2005 and 2018). 
 
While the institutionalist analysis sheds important lights on instances of systemic corruption, we 
also think that the phenomenon cannot be fully explained and satisfactorily analysed without 
reference to the conduct of individual institutional role-occupants considered in their 
interrelatedness. In this sense, unlike the institutionalists, we adopt a continuist interpretation of 
the institutional and the individual level analysis of systemic corruption (Ferretti 2018). 
 
On the continuist interpretation that we embrace, the features that make an institutional practice 
corrupt can always be traced back to some individual corrupt action. To illustrate this point, Maria 
Paola Ferretti (2018: 14-15) refers to corrupt systems of public procurement in cases of calls for 
tenders. By definition, the practice for selecting tenderers should be impartial in order to ensure 
the equal opportunity of applicants. However, under systemic corruption, it may become common 
practice that, upon paying DEULEH D WHQGHUHUPD\ VXEPLW D ¶ORZELG· with the agreement that 
subsequent price increases will be audited positively. The price increase may then be approved by 
a different officer; and the potential tenderers, being aware of the practice, may even form a cartel 
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in order to minimise the costs of participating in the selection procedure and establish a practice 
RIURWDWLRQWRHQVXUHWKDWHYHU\RQH·VWXUQRI¶ZLQQLQJ·WKHWHQGHUFRPHV The officials responsible 
for the selection procedure may, in fact, be favourable to this arrangement, which admittedly 
makes the selection quite straightforward. As Ferretti (2018: 15) notes, all agents follow a practice 
that has gradually become dominant over that of impartial and fair competition. Single officials 
may find themselves entangled in such a process without having deliberately initiated it, as perhaps 
they joined the institution in medias res. Nevertheless, it is their interrelated, more or less advertent 
individual involvement in the practice that makes public procurement systemically corrupt in this 
case. 
 
As this scenario shows, the practices constitutive of systemic corruption may not be grasped if we 
look only (or even just primarily) at the quality of the whole institution in isolation of the structural 
relations of interdependence that obtain between the individual RIILFHKROGHUV· actions. An 
institution and its constitutive practices are systemically corrupt because some officeholders have 
acted, advertently or inadvertently, to pursue an agenda whose rationale is incoherent with their 
power mandate. Corruption is therefore not an explanatory basic at the institutional level analysis, 
since it is always the result of a complex set of repeated interactions of multiple individual agents 
interrelated via their institutional roles (Ferretti 2018: 19).  
 
This continuist approach to systemic corruption is capable of offering an effective analytical tool 
for exploring the interdependence between structural mechanisms and individual actions within 
those structures. Because the corruption of a system can always be traced back to the corrupt 
conduct of at least some of its participants, our approach opens up a clear pathway for establishing 
the grounds for individual responsibility in instances of systemic corruption. In the following 
section, we identify and explore the role of reason-giving within such fundamentally unavowable 
yet sustained practices as systemic corruption. The ambition is to isolate a distinctive epistemic 
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core which anchors the responsibility of individual agents even in the absence of a deliberate 
contribution to systemic corruption on their part. 
 
3.  Reason-giving for systemic corruption  
 
On the continuist interpretation we articulated, systemic corruption is a fundamentally publicly 
unavowable institutional practice, which depends on the repeated involvement of multiple agents 
who use the power entrusted to their institutional roles on a rationale incoherent with that power 
mandate. The sustained character of this practice presupposes that individual participants have 
some shared understanding of what they are up to (Rouse 2007). In the absence of such 
understanding, systemic corruption would collapse into sheer dysfunctionality whereby 
institutional workings do not fit into the regular and predictable patterns of any identifiable 
practice. At the same time, KRZHYHUWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJcannot be shared either in a 
way that satisfies the publicity condition we outlined earlier, or in a way that turns systemic 
corruption into a clear-cut case of conspiracy. The former would equate systemic corruption with 
anodyne institutional change. The latter would preclude the possibility of a differential analysis of 
how and why the responsibility of individual officeholders might be engaged. If officeholders are 
all in it together in terms of clear-eyed conspiracy, there would be no conceptual room for half-
hearted objectors, innocent bystanders, or even burgeoning whistle-blowers, only hardened 
offenders.  
 
To move beyond these unsatisfactory options, we would like to explore the following hypothesis: 
the shared understanding of participants in systemic corruption as a fundamentally publicly 
unavowable institutional practice comes from the distinctive kind of individual rationalisations in 
which the participants in that practice engage with resources made available to them institutionally, 
VXFKDV ¶RII-the-SHJ· UHGHVFULSWLRQVRIGXELRXVFRQGXFWDVH[SHGLHQWand professional. We will 
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show two things. First, these rationalisations are necessarily less-than-successful. Second, the 
tainted reasoning they result in is a core exercise of agency for which responsibility is due. To do 
so, we shall first identify the criteria of success for reason-giving and then explain why individual 
rationalisations of systemic corruption cannot but fail to meet them.   
 
Broadly conceived, to rationalise RQH·V FRQGXFW is to make sense of it by appeal to reasons 
(Davidson 2001). Reasons can fall within one or more of the following three categories: normative, 
motivating, and explanatory (Alvarez 2013; Dancy 2000). For instance, when we cite a normative 
reason for an action, we present this action as worth performing in some respect. We offer a 
rationale for it as, say, a nice or a sensible thing to do. Normative reasons are prima facie 
justifications. A motivating reason, by contrast, is a consideration in the light of which an action is 
performed. It rationalises the action by spelling out its DJHQW·V rationale. Yet, a motivating reason 
may not be a good reason, in favour of the action performed, e.g. by being irrelevant or unduly 
partial. Finally, actions can be explained E\DSSHDOWR¶UHDVRQVZK\·'DQF\: 4-5). Examples 
include: putdowns uttered out of defensiveness, invitations refused out of shyness, and failures to 
repay people out of forgetfulness. In these cases, agents do not typically recognise the reasons 
which rationalise their actions as their own. When they do, this happens mainly as a result of 
reflection or feedback from others. Unlike motivating reasons, which are first-personal, 
explanatory reasons derive from a third-person perspective, which may not be immediately 
accessible to the agents themselves. 
 
This wide-scope view of reasons does not exhaust all possible accounts of rationalisation in the 
debate. We should at least mention a competing narrow-scope view premised on the idea that 
motivating reasons are the only reasons properly speaking, with some normative and explanatory 
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reasons admitted as limit cases to the extent that they are also motivating (Williams 1981).5 While 
this narrow-scope understanding may seem intuitive, we adopt the view that the space of reasons 
is in fact wider and should be understood as including all three categories of reasons as non-
derivative, bona fide reasons. Providing a full justification for this view of reason-giving falls 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. We will only highlight two main advantages of 
adopting the wide-scope view, which bear directly on the case we wish to make for the kind of 
rationalisation involved in systemic corruption.  
 
First, the wide-scope view allows us to make more nuanced an assessment of individual reason-
giving precisely because it distinguishes between different categories of reasons. Adopting this 
view gives us the conceptual tools for understanding how and why reason-giving may be less than 
successful. While there are no sharp edges between these categories, failing to recognise them as 
different in kind would leave us only able to register obvious cases of success or the lack of it. 
Keeping normative, motivating, and explanatory reasons separate in spite of their frequent 
overlaps allows a fine-grained analysis from different points of view, as required in systemic 
corruption given the many perspectives on the same actions ² personal and public ² and addressees 
of their rationalisations.   
 
                                                          
5 Possible further constraints include: (1) rationalisations are post hoc justifications that cannot explain their target 
DFWLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\DUHHSLVWHPLFDOO\LOOLFLWKDSSHQRXWVLGHWKHUHDVRQHU·VDZDUHQHVVDQGHQMR\KLJKGHJUHHV
of credence and resistance to critique and detection (Schwitzgebel and Ellis 2017; Summers 2017). As the later 
GLVFXVVLRQZLOOVKRZUDWLRQDOLVLQJRQH·VLQYROYHPHQWLQV\VWHPLFFRUUXSWLRQRIWHQH[KLELWVPRVWRIWKHVHIHDWXUHV<HW
bringing them together as a matter of definition is potentially misleading. It can solidify a picture of rationalisation as 
too remote from ordinary reason-giving, with extreme cases, such as committing a murder while sleepwalking in the 
spotlight. Conversely, it can lead to excessive doubts about ordinary reason-giving, overestimating the frequency and 
incorrigibility of faulty rationalisations. 
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Second, the wide-scope view helps to clarify why apparent misalignments across categories of 
reasons are an issue for the agents. This is because, when agents give reasons for their actions, they 
cannot fully rely on first-personal motivating reasons that are immediately accessible to them. 
When the first-person perspective is either unclear or insufficient, agents must also draw on eligible 
normative and explanatory resources. As seen, resort to explanatory reasons brings in a third-
SHUVRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHDJHQW·VDFWLRQ1RUPDWLYHUHDVRQVRQWKHLUSDUWPD\EHVHHQDVFDOOLQJ
in a second-personal perspective, at least on some relational account of morality (see Darwall 2006; 
Korsgaard 1996). From this perspective, the normative authority of reasons is not entirely internal 
to the agents, but depends on its being built, shared, and recognised by the members of a given 
community (who join in regarding an action as worth performing). Evidently, this 
multidimensional perspective is relevant in cases of complex patterns of interdependent individual 
actions where certain practices have had an intricate genealogy, are subject to different 
interpretations, and may acquire different significance from different perspectives. This complexity 
can certainly be seen in systemic corruption whose fundamentally publicly unavowable character 
jeopardises the alignment of the first-personal perspective with the second- and third-personal 
ones. 
 
The multi-dimensional aspect of rationalisation that the wide-scope view allows us to appreciate 
may, in fact, go unnoticed if we stick to a particular class of examples for reason-giving. These 
H[DPSOHVFHQWUHRQDQDJHQW·VDELOLW\WRDQVZHUWKH$QVFRPELDQTXHVWLRQ¶:K\"·YL]¶:KDWDUH
\RXGRLQJ"·ZLWKUHJDUGto her discrete intentional actions (Anscombe 1963). In such cases, giving 
a reason for what one is doing is the expression of direct, unmediated knowledge available only to 
agents as opposed to observers. Here, rationalising by inference from either normative or 
explanatory considerations is not an option for the agent. The ability to answer the Anscombian 
TXHVWLRQ ¶:K\"· LV PHDQW WR VLQJOH RXW RQJRLQJ LQWHQWLRQDO DFWLRQV IURP WKH ZLGHU UDQJH RI
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purposive behaviours and sub-personal bodily movements agents are engaged in. To see the 
interest of the distinction, consider the simple action of opening a window: 
Case 1: As I cross the room and reach to open the window, an acquaintance comes in and asks: 
¶:KDWDUH\RXGRLQJ"·,DQVZHUZLWKRXWKHVLWDWLRQ ¶:K\,·PRSHQLQJWKHZLQGRZ LW·VJHWWLQJ
stuffy in KHUH· 
Case 2: As I cross the room and reach to open the window, an acquaintance comes in and asks: 
¶:KDWDUH\RXGRLQJ"·,VWRSLQP\WUDFNVDQGJLYH LWVRPHWKRXJKWEHIRUHUHSO\LQJ¶:HOO,PXVW
KDYHZDQWHG WRRSHQ WKHZLQGRZ LW·V VWXII\KHUH7R WHOO \RX WKH WUXWK ,·YHEHHQ UXQQLQJRQ
DXWRSLORWDOOGD\· 
 
In Case 1, the rationalisation offered is complete. Opening the window makes sense in virtue of 
being an intentional action. The agent can cite the reason for which she performs the action readily 
and truthfully. Case 2 exhibits a different kind of rationalisation. Opening the window becomes 
intelligible to both the agent and the observer as something done absentmindedly, out of habit. 
7KHUHDVRQVFLWHGGRQRWGHPRQVWUDWHWKHDJHQW·VGLUHFWNQRZOHGJHRIKHUDFWLRQ, but support a 
credible conjecture. 
 
Looking at the two cases side by side, reason-giving in the first case clearly does a better job than 
reason-giving in the second. The agent in Case 1 knows what she is doing: she is acting for a 
reason. She is also confident it is a good reason. This tells us two important things about successful 
rationalisations. First, they are subject to an accuracy requirement. Answering the Anscombian 
TXHVWLRQ¶:K\"·LVXQOLNHFUHDWLQJILFWLRQDERXWRQH·VDFWLRQV6 Some further constraints have to 
                                                          
6 Readers familiar with recent work on truth in fiction, e.g. Lewis (1978), Currie (1990), Woodward (2011), might be 
inclined to think that sheer intelligibility brings in considerable constraints. These constraints should not be so quickly 
dismissed as insufficient. We do not have the space to pursue further this possible line of inquiry here. Instead, we 
would like to highlight the intuitive contrast between giving a report on a action and telling a story about it. As will become 
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do with the context or circumstances RIWKHDFWLRQ¶LW·VJHWWLQJVWXII\KHUH·2WKHUVUHIHUWRWKH
range of actions that can make good sense in this context (opening a window is one of them). 
Neither set of constraints can be ascertained by introspection alone, or is inaccessible to other 
agents and reasoners. So, when rationalisation goes well, it affirms the limited authority agents 
have as self-NQRZHUV2·%ULHQUDWKHUWKDQWKHXQERXQGUHVRXUFHIXOQHVVWKH\PLJKWGHYHORS
as story-tellers (Doris 2015). 
 
The second thing we learn from Case 1 is that successful rationalisations point to a neat alignment 
between categories of reasons. The reason in the light of which the agent opens the window is 
good (motivating and normative considerations pull in the same direction). It also explains the action 
IXOO\WKHUHLVQRQHHGWRORRNIRUDQH[WUD¶UHDVRQZK\·WKHH[SODQDWRU\GLPHQVLRQLVDEVRUEHGE\
the motivational one).  
 
The two features of successful rationalisations elicited by the Anscombian TXHVWLRQ ¶:K\"· ² 
accuracy and alignment across dimensions of reasons ² become particularly attractive when the 
consideration of actions turns to allocating responsibility as opposed to disinterested 
understanding. A counterfactual conversation with those DIIHFWHGE\RQH·VDFWLRQVRUDQLQWHUQDO
dialogue modelled on it is a core idea for many conceptions of responsibility (e.g. Macnamara 
2015, McKenna 2012, Wallace 1994) ,Q WKLV FRPPXQLFDWLYH VHWWLQJ JLYLQJ UHDVRQV IRU RQH·V
actions plays a key role in being and holding responsible (Smith 2007). It involves anticipating 
FKDOOHQJHVEXWDOVRVKRZLQJGXHFRQFHUQIRURWKHUV·LQWHUHVWVDQGSHUVSHFWLYHV,QWKLVZD\UHDVRQ-
JLYLQJ GHPRQVWUDWHV DQ DJHQW·V VHFXUH EHORQJLQJ WR WKH PRUDO FRPPXQLW\ ZKHUH WKH VR-called 
                                                          
clear, on the view we put forward, the more successful a rationalisation is, the closer it gets to the former as opposed 
to the latter. 
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reactive attitudes, such as resentment or gratitude, the backbone of being and holding responsible, 
can be appropriately addressed (Strawson 1962; Shoemaker and Tognazzini 2014).  
 
So understood, the interpersonal significance of allocating responsibility for individual actions 
might seem to call for adopting Case 1 or an equivalent as a paradigm for responsible reason-
giving (see, Hieronymi 2004; 2008; 2014). In a nutshell, in this view, responsibility is about the way 
in which an agent settles questions, like whether to undertake a particular course of action, maintain 
an attitude or a relationship, or revisit an existing commitment. In all relevant cases, the agent is 
answerable to the $QVFRPELDQTXHVWLRQ¶:K\"·7KLVTXHVWLRQWUDFNVWKHUHDVRQVLQWKe light of 
which the agent acted or refrained from acting, maintained or revisited attitudes, commitments or 
relationships of hers.  
 
However, we wish to show that taking up Case 1 as paradigmatic in this way could be misleading. 
While we acknowledge the centrality of the two features of successful rationalisations identified 
though Case 1, cases of interest for the purposes of responsibility assessments are unlikely to 
exhibit the clarity and simplicity that make Case 1 so appealing. Not all things for which agents 
might be required or would want to give reasons are structurally similar to the single-minded 
opening of a window.7 
 
Ongoing intentional actions can be rationalised as lucidly as Case 1 only under the specific 
descriptions XQGHUZKLFKWKH\DUHLQWHQWLRQDO$QVFRPEH·VRULJLQDOH[DPSOHRI ¶pumping water· 
sheds ample light on this limitation. A man moves his arm up and down to operate a cistern. The 
                                                          
7 Examples include: long-term projects or practices that evolve over time and rely on multiple agents (Lear 2017), but 
also past intentions of a single agent (Child 2006). In either case, reason-giving takes the form of a more or less 
ODERXUHG¶JDS-ILOOLQJ·UDWKHUWKDQLPPHGLDWHDUWLFXODWLRQ We will expand on this point in the subsequent discussion. 
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water in the cistern is poisonous; the man thus supplies water to a house and ultimately poisons 
its inhabitants. While the pumping man is aware the water he pumps into the house is poisonous, 
he may not intend killing its inhabitants. He may only intend to earn a living by doing his job 
(Anscombe 1963: 37² 44). So, when asked what he is doing and why, the man can produce a reply 
that does not mention the effect of his activities on the inhabitants of the house. The pumping 
man may not be deliberately misleading. He could simply be stating the description under which 
his moving his arm up and down is intentional ² pumping water into the house ² and the reason 
in the light of which he is doing the pumping ² earning his wages. His answer seemingly matches 
the lucidity of reason-giving in Case 1. And to the extent that we are only interested in learning 
what the actual reason motivating the pumping man is, this answer might be okay. If however, the 
exchange is part of a PRUDODGGUHVVWKHSXPSLQJPDQ·VDQVZHUseems deeply disturbing.  
 
In the case of the pumping man, moral address aims to establish WKHPDQ·V involvement in the 
LQKDELWDQWV· IDWH It centres on such questions DV ¶:K\DUH\RXSRLVRQLQJ WKH LQKDELWDQWV"·7R
answer by merely indicating the description under which he is acting intentionally ² supplying 
water to the house to earn his wages ² would demonstrate an uncommon lack of concern for 
human life: the pumping man puts his own trivial interests (he could find a similar job elsewhere) 
DKHDGRIRWKHUV·VXUYLYDO+HUHUHDVRQ-giving cannot end with identifying a motive for the action 
performed. Knowingly or not, this motive is also located within the realm of possible justifications, 
as a reason that speaks in favour of this action. By failing to mention any misgivings, the pumping 
man rationalises his actions in a way that disavows the normative significance of reasons that speak 
against them.  
 
The upshot mimics the integrated rationalisation we saw in Case 1. A deep misalignment between 
the normative and the motivational dimensions is thus initially concealed. This misalignment also 
XQGHUPLQHV WKH H[SODQDWRU\ IRUFH RI WKH SXPSLQJ PDQ·V UHDVRQ-giving: by omitting silenced 
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normative reasons that speak against supplying poisoned water to a household, the man is creating 
the illusion that these reasons are extraneous to understanding what he is doing. Importantly, this 
kind of rationalisation does not have to be deliberately undertaken. The pumping man might be 
as much a prey as a perpetrator of his elusive reason-giving.  
 
The relevant counterpart against which to assess the quality of the SXPSLQJPDQ·VUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ
is not Case 1, but Case 2. The features to look out for are as follows. First, in Case 2 there is a 
disconnection across dimensions of reasons. Second, reason-giving in Case 2 raises the question 
of how to realign different categories of reasons. The pXPSLQJPDQ·VUDWLRnalisation leaves things 
as they are: the underlying disconnection between normative and motivating reasons remains 
unaddressed. The action under consideration is under-explained and misinterpreted. Drawing on 
recent work on motivated irrationality (Radoilska 2013), we can say that reason-giving of this kind 
is necessarily less-than-successful. By this we mean to highlight that this reasoning is bound to fail 
both criteria of successful rationalisations: (i) accuracy and (ii) alignment across the normative, 
motivating, and explanatory dimensions of reasons for the target action. In contrast, the pumping 
PDQ·VUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQcould have been successful had it followed the model illustrated in Case 2. 
True, reason-giving in the Case 1 does a neater job; however, it also has, as we showed, a lighter 
task than reason-giving in Case 2, which can thus provide a model for reason-giving in such 
complex scenarios as that of the pumping man. 
 
How would this picture help to elucidate the workings of rationalising DQ RIILFHKROGHU·V own 
involvement in systemically corrupt institutional practices? Looking at the constitutive features of 
systemic corruption, there are good grounds to believe that the individual rationalisations it 
involves are, like that in WKH¶Pumping Man· scenario, necessarily less-than-successful. To recall, in 
a legitimate institutional system, institutional role-occupants are expected to provide reasons for 
their conduct that can withstand public scrutiny in keeping with the terms of the power mandate 
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entrusted to their office. When officeholders are involved in such a publicly unavowable practice 
as systemic corruption, this expectation is typically met by WKHRIILFHKROGHUV· redescribing their 
conduct into terms that show a certain coherence with the rationale that should inform their 
professional actions, whereby the glaring contradictions between used and mandated power are 
glossed over.  
 
On some occasions, such redescriptions might be undertaken with a clear purpose in mind, that 
of fobbing off potential critics. This superficial kind of redescription however would not qualify 
as rationalisation, successful or otherwise. For an officeholder who engages in this kind of 
redescriptions does so precisely to avoid giving reasons for her professional conduct. By 
redescribing her criticised actions as intra vires, she means to leave them unaccounted for. This is 
not because she at a loss for DQVZHULQJWKH$QVFRPELDQTXHVWLRQ¶:K\"·2QWKHFRQWUDU\ the 
corrupt officeholder is acutely aware that there is an accurate explanation to hand ¶,DPGRLQJLW
IRUP\SHUVRQDOJDLQ· which however falls short of the normative expectations that come with her 
institutional role. Therefore, she maliciously redescribes her action. 
 
This kind of redescription might be enough to answer for RQH·VEHKDYLRXUin cases of individual 
or occasional corruption. However, it would not suffice to maintain the entrenched ways of 
operating ultra vires (and getting away with it) constitutive of systemic corruption. To support 
such a complex practice, within the constraints placed by its fundamentally unavowable character, 
redescriptions should be able to somehow address the flagrant discrepancies between normative 
and motivating reasons that corruption creates. Arguably, redescriptions would also need to 
obliterate competing explanatory reasons from coming to the surface and jeopardising the process 
RIUDWLRQDOLVLQJRQH·VRZQ involvement in systemic corruption, vis-à-vis similarly placed agents. 
7KLVSUHGLFDPHQW LVDQ LPSOLFDWLRQRIWKH ¶SXEOLF·QDWXUHRIWKHDFFRXQWVWKDWRIILFHKROGHUVDUH
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expected to give for their actions by placing equal weight onto first-, second-, and third-personal 
perspectives. 
 
To see how and why this kind of thorough redescription takes the distinctive form of a necessarily 
less-than-successful rationalisation, let us explore it in relation to two possible counterparts: 
instances of self-deception, on the one hand, and reason-giving for actions performed for no 
SDUWLFXODUUHDVRQRURQ¶DXWRSLORW·, on the other.  
 
Self-deception is one type of motivated irrationality. It affects directly reasons for belief and, by 
extension, reasons for action. While there are competing conceptualisations of this phenomenon 
(Bach 1981; Davidson 2004; Mele 1987), there is a clear overlap on paradigm cases: a believer is 
faced with some compelling evidence that something is the case; yet, she strongly desires this not 
to be so. Viewed through the lens of her partial motivation, the unwelcome evidence is recast as 
consistent with, if not favourable to, what she wants to be the case. She ends up convinced it is 
DFWXDOO\ WKH FDVH )RROLQJ RQHVHOI LQWR WKLQNLQJ RQH·V SDUWQHU LV IDLWKIXO LQ VSLWH RI PRXQWLQJ
evidence to the contrary is a standard example (Mitova 2017). As Lynch (2016: 515) helpfully 
REVHUYHV¶:KDW·VLPSRUWDQWKHUHLVWKe existence of a discrepancy: a discrepancy between what the 
VXEMHFW·V GR[DVWLF VWDWH LV DQG ZKDW LW VKRXOG EH JLYHQ KHU HYLGHQFH· /\QFK WKHQ JRHV RQ WR
distinguish between self-deception and wilful ignorance. The two phenomena have a similar 
function: they help an agent resist an unwelcome revision of plans pressed on her by the emergence 
of contrary evidence. This function, however, is discharged differently in each case. 
 
Unlike wilful ignorance, self-deception is not a process in which believers typically engage at will; 
if that were the case, the resulting beliefs would be insufficiently stable. Self-deceiving believers 
also labour at a greater disadvantage than wilfully ignorant agents. The former have to deal with 
contrary evidence they have already stumbled upon. The latter only have to avoid direct exposure 
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to the contrary evidence they correctly surmise is out there. This is why the discrepancy between 
actual and warranted doxastic states Lynch highlights as defining in cases of self-deception does 
not occur in cases of wilful ignorance: its point is precisely to pre-empt conflict by keeping the 
agent away from potential sources of conflicting evidence.  
 
While it is obvious that wilful ignorance may occur in cases of systemic corruption,8 it cannot be 
the underlying mechanism that supports the ongoing rationalisation RIVRPHRQH·VLQYROYHPHQWLQ
such a practice. In these cases, HYLGHQFH RI RQH·V RZQ FRUUXSWLRQ LV UHDGLO\ DYDLODEOH to any 
participant in the system. Recall from the previous section WKHFRUUXSWSUDFWLFHRI ¶ORZELG·DV
instantiating bribery and relations of clientele, in the scenario of public procurement in cases of 
calls for tenders. It is true that an official·s accepting a bribe or favouring WKH¶ORZELG·RIDWHQGHUHU
in spite of the principle of impartial and fair competition is consistent with a generalised behaviour 
on the part of his co-workers. This consistency might even be deemed to normalise the corrupt 
practice in a statistical sense. At the same time, however, WKDWRIILFHKROGHU·V institutional power 
mandate is not ipso facto altered, nor does it become suddenly inaccessible to the agent. The terms 
RIWKHRIILFHKROGHU·VSRZHUPDQGDWHUHPDLQ as readily available as ever. And their incoherence 
with the rationale of the unavowable practice in which the officeholder partakes is not a matter of 
warranted suspicion but of putting, as it were, two and two together. In such cases, we can hardly 
imagine that the corrupt agent can wilfully ignore the corrupt nature of his ongoing activities in an 
effectual and sustainable way.  
 
                                                          
8 Luban (1999) discusses a helpful example: a corporate boss who puts pressure on his team to deliver but does not 
want to know how the expected results have been achieved. This is because he suspects the law is likely to be broken 
in the process. Not being informed would give him deniability in the case of an investigation. 
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The routine and predictable nature of systemic corruption as a practice might bring it closer to 
LQVWDQFHVRIDFWLQJIRUQRSDUWLFXODUUHDVRQRURQ¶DXWRSLORW·WKHVHFRQGFRXQWHUSDUWZHZRXOGOLNH
to consider. Picking an item out of a group of near identical items, as in shopping, is a helpful 
example. As shown by recent psychological work cited by Doris (2015), most people tend to 
respond to the question of why they have chosen the item they have picked out by pointing to 
some non-existent superior features it has over the items they left, e.g. being softer or of a nicer 
FRORXUIRUSLHFHVRIFORWKLQJ6XFKFDVHVLOOXVWUDWHDFRPPRQWHQGHQF\WRILQGUHDVRQVIRURQH·V
behaviour when challenged rather than admitting there are none. According to Doris, this 
tendency could be explained by conversational pressures to show oneself as a reliable, consistent, 
DQGFRPSHWHQWDJHQW,QRWKHUZRUGVZHFDQQRWVD\DOOWRRRIWHQ¶,KDYHQRLGHDZK\,GLGLW·
Locutions of this type are meant to remain exceptional, explanations of last resort. 
 
The pressure to engage in excessive reason-giving is likely to be even stronger when an agent is 
asked to account for stretches of activity which contribute to the performance of an organisational 
task. When she acts on the basis of the tasks routinely assigned to her role within an organisation, 
she frequently acts RQ¶DXWRSLORW·SUHFLVHO\LQYLUWXHRIWKHpredictable nature of her impersonal 
(qua role-based) actions. Looking at the emerging analytic literature on habitual actions (Pollard 
2010; Delacroix 2017), practiced routines exhibit a distinctive trade-RIIZLWK UHVSHFW WRDJHQWV·
knowledge: the more competent and fluent agents become in their ¶NQRZKRZ·WKHOHVVDZDUHWKH\
are of what they are doing in terms of component actions. Walking, typing, dancing are everyday 
illustrations of this effect of habituation.  
 
So, when asked to account for a stretch of a routine activity, agents will tend to answer by 
identifying good or acceptable reasons for their performance rather than acknowledging its 
unconsidered character. And, as argued in a recent paper (Summers 2017), this tendency might 
not be bad news altogether. While the rationalisation this tendency supports is, in terms of the 
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current discussion, less-than-successful with respect to the stretch of activity it is meant to explain 
(because it fails on account of inaccuracy), it nevertheless helps the agent to get better at acting on 
good reasons in the long run. For having rationalised a previously unconsidered stretch of activity 
by claimiQJ WKHEHVW UHDVRQV WKDW VSHDN LQ LWV IDYRXU DVRQH·VRZQ WKH DJHQW WDFLWO\ EHJLQV WR
internalise them as they grow more and more salient in her future planning and deliberations.  
 
This benign, propaedeutic effect of some less-than-successful rationalisations is unlikely to obtain 
in systemic corruption. This is because the individual rationalisations it rests on are informed by 
what we shall term, following Lear (2017), a distinctive ¶crisis of intelligibility·. Consider /HDU·V
original example as a point of contrast. The end of nomadic life in the 19th c. when North-
American tribes, such as the Crow, were moved on to reservations, marked the disruption of the 
intelligibility of WKH1DWLYHV·actions as a result of losing the way of life which gave these actions a 
meaning. As Lear (2017, p. 54) points out¶«LIJRLQJRQDKXQWDQGJRLQJLQWRZDUDQGJRLQJRQ
a nomadic migration all become impossible, then there are no longer any acts that can intelligibly 
count as preparing to go to war, on a hunt, on a migration. Nor can anything intelligibly count as 
intending to perform such acts.· Both the collective and individual self-understanding of agents is 
impeded since they can no longer use the categories and concepts of their past in order to plan, 
deliberate or give reasons for what they are doing.  
 
The crisis of intelligibility that systemic corruption brings in takes a different form. When 
patronage comes to govern the access to some public office, for example, the reasons of 
impartiality and fairness that should guide the procedure continue to apply and make sense and, 
therefore, it is not the case that they have become unavailable to the participants. Instead, 
intelligibility is subverted through excess of ready-made rationalisations, so that the agents· 
individual involvement in some publicly unavowable institutional practices may never come to the 
fore and be acknowledged as such. The currency of redescriptions that turn patronage into a matter 
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of mutual trust and institutional efficiency facilitates individual doublethink in the mould of the 
prevalent institutional doublespeak. This kind of tainted reasoning shelters the unavowable 
practice (and its sustaining reasons) at the root of the crisis from both external and internal 
scrutiny. In so doing, this reasoning provides the degree of shared, stable, albeit partial 
understanding required to sustain systemic corruption as a multiple-agent practice. 
 
It may be tempting to conclude that agents who try to rationalise their actions in circumstances of 
systemic corruption effectively labour under severe epistemic disadvantage. To break out of the 
cycle of necessarily less-than-successful rationalisations, the participants in a fundamentally 
publicly unavowable practice need specific epistemic resources: ways of rethinking their 
indefensible routines to recover some scope for appropriate agency. Yet, as highlighted, these 
resources are persistently obscured by the distorting and distracting logic that underpins systemic 
corruption. In this respect, officeholders who partake in publicly unavowable institutional practices 
may find it difficult to recognise their own corruption for what it is. Even if their original power 
mandate is not erased or rendered meaningless, the performance of their institutional tasks in 
keeping with that mandate is undermined. In addition, many individual officeholders are likely to 
have been inducted through WKHLUFROOHDJXHV·unavowable conduct from the very beginning; they 
have not seen the undiluted institutional mandate put into practice but have always acted on its 
tainted version.  
 
These observations capture an important side of individual rationalisations for systemic 
corruption. Yet, focusing on the epistemic disadvantage that is revealed can easily lead us to 
misread the situation. Officeholders who participate in some publicly unavowable practices would 
then appear as though inadvertent victims of epistemic injustice, a set of wrongs that afflict 
individuals in their capacity as knowers (Fricker 2007). Such agents, however, are first and foremost 
tainted reasoners. Their proficiency in doublethink is instrumental for the upkeep of the 
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unavowable practice they might have joined inadvertently. So, if we wanted to explore their status 
in terms of epistemic injustice, we should start by recognising them as co-producers of an injustice, 
rather than bystanders, who end up being harmed.  
 
As seen, officeholders who participate in systemically corrupt institutional practices are faced with 
ample evidence of what they are up to. By engaging in the sort of necessarily less-than-successful 
rationalisations typical of systemic corruption, they are able to act without feeling conflicted or 
endangering their self-image. That they proceed through mechanisms of self-deception rather than 
well-planned cover-ups does not indicate loss of epistemic agency. On the contrary, these tainted 
reasoners are appropriate target for the kind of criticism that would be out of place if, through 
misinformation, they made an honest mistake about what their power mandate demands of them.  
 
In this respect, tainted reasoners are akin to knowers, whose performance is indicative of an 
epistemic vice. Adopting the motivational account put forward in Tanesini (2018), we take 
epistemic vices as dispositions, whose core feature is non-instrumental aversion to epistemic goods 
OLNHILQGLQJRXWZKDWWKHFDVHLVRUPDNLQJXSRQH·VPLQGIRUWKHULJKWNLQGRIUHDVRQV7KDWLVWR
say, the self-VHUYLQJIXQFWLRQRIUDWLRQDOLVLQJRQH·VRZQFRUUXSWLRQ is not self-standing. Neither 
recasting unwanted evidence as innocuous, nor excessive reason-giving for unconsidered actions 
can be sustained without the entrenchment of pro-attitudes, such as indifference to the truth, that 
make tainted reasoning more likely to go unchallenged if not undetected. 
  
4. Responsibility for tainted reasoning  
 
2QWKHDFFRXQWZHSXWIRUZDUGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQUDWLRQDOLVLQJRQH·VRZQ involvement in 
systemic corruption is a kind of first-personal reason-giving, whose distinctive feature is to be 
necessarily less-than-successful. More specifically, these rationalisations can provide answers to the 
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$QVFRPELDQTXHVWLRQ¶:K\"·WKDWGo not only happen to be inaccurate. They also make the second 
key task of reason-giving, aligning different categories of reasons ² justificatory, explanatory, and 
motivational ² practically impossible with respect to individual actions that jointly make up the  
publicly unavowable, yet shared and sustained practice of systemic corruption. We argued that the 
rationalisation at work in such cases is best understood as a kind of tainted reasoning at the 
interface between epistemic disadvantage and epistemic vice.  
 
To understand individual rationalisations for systemic corruption in terms of tainted reasoning 
might be taken as a ground for the partial excuse of the agents involved. In the following, we aim 
to show why this is not the case. Individual responsibility for tainted reasoning is sui generis. It 
indicates an epistemic core underpinning moral, legal, and political considerations on the matter. 
By acknowledging and exploring this core, we are in a better position to help to resolve some 
intractable disagreements on the nature and scope of responsibility which have shaped recent 
debates.  
 
In essence, these disagreements derive from two competing views on what a person can be 
ultimately responsible for. On the first view, responsibility assessments are meant to track 
intentional actions and omissions. This view highlights such notions as choice, understanding, 
planning, and deliberation. Responsible agents know what they are doing. When they fail to fulfil 
DQ REOLJDWLRQ RU ULVH XS WR VRPH UHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQ WKHLU ZURQJGRLQJ LV GHHPHG ¶DNUDWLF·
(Rosen 2004). That is to say, they are aware of some overriding normative reasons that speak 
against their chosen course of action but engage in that action all the same. This awareness is what 
distinguishes blameworthy transgressions and failures from regrettable accidents and misfortunes 
brought about by blameless agents. Culpable ignorance is thus reduced to a prior choice to ignore 
RUDV6PLWKWHUPVLWD¶GHOLEHUDWHEHQLJKWLQJDFW·7KLVFKRLFHneed not have the wrongdoing 
under consideration for its object. A decision made a long time ago would suffice, providing it 
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explains this wrongdoing as a direct, credible consequence of something the agent has chosen 
advertently in the past.  
 
Theories that conceive the scope of responsibility DVLWFRQFHUQVWKHDJHQW·VDGYHUWHQWSDVWDFWLRQV
tend to endorse a particular view of its nature too: responsibility as accountability. This view interprets 
different practices of responsibility ² be they legal or moral ² as grounded in the core notion of a 
reciprocal bond, holding agents accountable to one another in the light of rules that can, at least 
in principle, be justified to and agreed upon by all parties concerned. This is because being 
accountable for something amounts to being open to sanctions, viz. an increased normative 
burden in response to failures, omissions, or poor performance with respect to that thing. In 
institutional contexts, this normative burden might take the form of a penalty, a fine, or even a 
custodial sentence. In everyday contexts, however, this burden need not involve anything further 
than moral address in terms of blame. To be held accountable, in this way, is to be identified as 
the fair target of a negative moral assessment in virtue of what one has done. A constant feature 
DFURVVGLIIHUHQWPRGDOLWLHVLVWKHZURQJGRHU·VFOHDUUHGXFWLRQof standing within a community of 
reference: the citizens of a country, the members of a profession, the moral community as a whole. 
To restore her standing, an accountable agent would take up the normative burden her guilty 
wrongdoing created ² by paying the fine, serving the sentence, issuing an apology, or seeking other 
appropriate means to redress her normative shortcomings. 
 
As shown in this brief outline,9 responsibility as accountability integrates a strong requirement of 
fairness as reciprocity. Being held accountable can be onerous for the agent. And so, responsible 
agents have a strong interest in being shielded from arbitrary, confounding, or ever-changing 
patterns of blame. If they find themselves frequently open to censure through no fault of their 
                                                          
9 For an extended discussion, see Radoilska 2013, Ch.1. 
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own, with no recourse to defence, the practices of responsibility would simply collapse into 
something akin to witch-hunt. Importantly, these practices will no longer be able to provide 
responsible agents with reasons that speak authoritatively in favour, or against, any particular 
course of action. This central idea ² it is unfair, hence impermissible to hold people accountable 
for things that are not up to them ² is neatly translated into the notion of ¶akratic wrongdoing·. As 
Mason (2015: SXWVLW¶7KHUHLVDGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQIDLOLQJWRJHWWKLQJVULJKWDQGIDLOLQJWR
JHW WKHP ULJKW LQ D EODPHZRUWK\ ZD\· %\ LQVLVWLQJ RQ D GHILQable epistemic error, which is 
imputable to the agent as a wrongdoing in its own right rather than an honest mistake, 
responsibility as accountability is kept free from the dangers of vindictiveness. 
 
By contrast, on the second view, responsibility is fundamentally about the attitudes or quality of 
will a person shows toward the others. Notably, the view of responsibility as attributability does not 
only track intentional actions and omissions, but a brRDGHU VHWRIPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIDQDJHQW·V
moral character or personality.10 The exclusive focus on intentional manifestations of character is 
deemed indicative of the misplaced concern about reciprocity and fairness at the root of the idea 
of responsibility as accountability. The proponents of this alternative attributivist position see 
PRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVDVWRRIXQGDPHQWDOWREH¶XSWRXV·+LHURQ\PL5HVSRQVLELOLW\
as attributability is incurred directly for being who one is rather than for what one does or does 
not do intentionally. To be responsible, in this view, a person need not be knowledgeable of what 
she is responsible for. The rejection of an overall knowledge condition on responsibility goes two 
                                                          
10 Some authors, whose work fits within this approach, e.g. Smith (2005; 2012), disown the label and opt instead for 
WKDWRI¶DQVZHUDELOLW\·7KHDPELWLRQLVWRUHVLVWWKHFKDUJHRIDUWLFXODWLQJDOHVVHUGHULYDWLYHNLQGRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\
VXFKDV ¶DUHtaic aSSUDLVDO· VHH:DWVRQWKDW LVVRPHWLPHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIDWWULEXWDELOLW\ ,Q WKH
SUHVHQWGLVFXVVLRQ ZHZLOO FRQWLQXH WR HPSOR\ ¶DWWULEXWDELOLW\· DV LW FDSWXUHVEHWWHr the distinctive features of the 
responsibility conception under consideration, without assuming it is less fundamental than its competitor, 
responsibility as accountability. 
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ways along the spectrum of attributability: at the negative end, it opens up the possibility for non-
derivative culpable ignorance; at the positive end, it inaugurates the possibility for ¶akratic right-
doing·. Let us briefly consider each of these openings in turn. 
 
To be culpable, ignorance does not have to originate from a blameworthy epistemic error. Instead, 
it can be the very target of negative moral appraisal, e.g., for showing disregard, lack of care, or 
indifference to others. On such occasions, ill will is rightly attributed to a person in virtue of, not 
in spite of, her ignorance. Crucially, blameworthiness here does not rely on a claim that the blamed 
agent could or should have not known better. Nor does it carry the normative expectation that the 
blamed agent stand corrected or get to know better in the future. The so-called hard cases of moral 
ignorance, such as ancient slave holders and psychopathic offenders, offer compelling illustrations 
of how this practice of responsibility might work. The moral address is still condemnation. It 
LQYROYHV¶FRPSOHWHDOLHQDWLRQ·EXW¶QRGHPDQGIRUDPHQGV· (Mason 2015: 3055). 
 
While attributable wrongdoings need not be akratic, attributable right-doings or praiseworthy 
actions can be so. A person who displays good will in her interactions with others can be thus 
credited for that attitude independently of her professed moral outlook. Such creditable displays 
also include actions that the good-willed person herself wrongly considers as morally objectionable 
while performing them, as in the much-discussed case of Huck Finn (Arpaly 2003; 2015; Bennett 
1974). Recall that LQ0DUN7ZDLQ·VHSRQ\PRXVQRYHO+XFN LVDZKLWHER\IURPWKH$PHULFDQ
South who befriends Jim, a runaway slave. Huck believes it is his duty to turn in his new friend 
but cannot bring himself to do so and berates himself for being a bad boy. 
 




aside as applicable to a very limited range of cases to supply a comprehensive view on 
responsibility. For naïve displays of good will are of little help in most practices of responsibility 
where competence, discernment and a whole variety of other intellectual attributes are essential 
(Hills 2015). Professional roles are obvious examples. However, this observation also applies to 
most everyday interactions where proper care for the interests of others still requires some aptitude 
for reasoning. 
 
Akratic right-doing is rarely naïve in this way. While good-willed people may not be skilled in 
articulating the reasons for their creditable actions, they are not only likely to act for a reason, they 
are also likely to act for the right kind of reason: RXWRI IULHQGVKLS DQG FRQFHUQ IRU DQRWKHU·V
ZHOOEHLQJDVLQ+XFN·VFDVH. In this respect, responsibility as attributability builds on the narrow-
scope account of reasons we critically explored in the previous section. On this account, a strict 
distinction is made between forward-looking reasoning and post-hoc rationalisations. Since agents 
can be mistaken in reading back introspectively what motivated their actions, the practice of 
responsibility is focused on reading their motives directly, from the perspective of an ideal moral 
community. 
 
As the above discussion indicates, a strong case can be made for each of the two competing 
conceptions of responsibility, as accountability or attributability, assuming the instances they 
identify as paradigmatic for the practice of responsibility are correct. Yet, in spite of the growing 
range of sophisticated variants of these positions in the debate (see Robichaud and Wieland 2017), 
neither view has succeeded in explaining away the appeal of the other, thus offering a compelling 
overall picture of responsibility.  
 
In response, some authors (e.g. Mason 2015, Shoemaker 2015) have now opted for a pluralist 
approach, where different kinds of responsibility are mapped onto different areas of our moral 
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lives. This approach however offers more of a diagnosis than a solution. We are given rich 
phenomenological descriptions of self-contained, parallel practices of responsibility. We are also 
told how to make sense of their respective criteria from within. Yet, these advantages come at the 
expense of dissolving any critical perspective that would cut across individual practices. 
Responsibility begins to look like an umbrella concept covering over a fragmented field rather than 
a guiding principle helping to elucidate, compare and, if needed, correct established ways of being 
and holding responsible. 
 
We would like to take a different route, which follows from the recognition of an epistemic core 
shared by different practices of responsibility. Instead of either intentional actions or attitudes 
toward others, we focus on reason-giving as more fundamental for assessing responsibility. This 
focus allows us to break the impasse between the two competing approaches while keeping 
valuable insights from both. As acknowledged within responsibility as accountability, epistemic 
blameworthiness is at the heart of negative moral appraisal. Yet, as clarified within responsibility 
as attributability, this blameworthiness does not have to take the form of a specific fault. By 
shedding light onto dispositions, such as disregard for the facts and other forms of epistemic vice 
agents actively employ in their reason-giving, it is possible to recover some shared ground theorists 
of responsibility have missed so far.  
 
At first blush, this claim might seem implausible. Responsiveness to reasons already figures in 
many existing conceptions of responsibility, across the divide between accountability and 
attributability (e.g. Wallace 1994, Watson 1996, Smith 2005). What is more, responsiveness to 
reasons is particularly significant in views (e.g. Hieronymi 2008; 2014) which, as discussed in §2, 
conceive answerability to the Anscombian quHVWLRQ ¶:K\"·DV ground for a new conception of 
responsibility. These apparent similarities notwithstanding, it is important to note that on these 
views responsiveness to reasons still indicates a precondition for the establishment of 
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responsibility rather than its primary object. By contrast, our focus on reason-giving points to a 
fundamental activity bridging the gap between backward- and forward-looking practical 
considerations. It also clarifies the interdependency between individual actions, institutional 
structures, and common practices within those structures that involve multiple individuals. When 
we give reasons for what we do, we take a stance about the past that commits us to a particular 
future. In so doing, we buttress, challenge, revise, or disengage with the practices that made what 
we do intelligible in the first place.  
 
Tainted reasoning is a case in point. It is constitutive of systemic corruption, not merely caused by 
it.  Instead of being inflicted on individual officeholders, the rationalisations they engage in are the 
very nourishment of the perpetration over time of some fundamentally publicly unavowable 
institutional practices, like clientelism in the provision of such public services as healthcare, 
nepotism in the allocation of jobs in the public sector, or partisan systems of public procurement 
for major construction works ² to recall some of the examples discussed earlier. When clientelism 
is redescribed in terms of accessibility, nepotism as a bond of trust and ¶ORZELGV· DV HIILFLHQW
selection procedures-, the officeholders involved in these redescriptions are tainted reasoners, who 
are not just struggling with some epistemic burdens their institutions impose on them. Instead, 
their responsibility for reason-giving is fully engaged.  
 
Being able to assess individual reason-giving as constitutive of systemic corruption is an important 
contribution of our view as it allows us also to establish individual back- and forward-looking 
responsibilities with precision. This establishment could help avoid the disturbing extremes of 
individual scapegoating, on the one hand, and collective witch-hunting, on which some populist 
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rhetoric frequently trades, on the other.11 But the view of responsibility we have proposed has also 
some more general implications for the analysis and normative assessment of individual agents in 
their capacity as reasoners. We devote the last section of the paper to bring one such an implication 
to the fore.  
 
5. Closing remarks: Responsible ignorance 
 
We wish to bring our argument to a close with a final suggestion concerning tainted reasoning as 
a helpful model for understanding responsible ignorance more broadly. Ignorance, just like 
knowledge or skill, can be the outcome of our epistemic endeavours, something we actively pursue. 
Pointing this out does not commit us to an implicit notion of wilful ignorance as in akratic 
wrongdoing. There is a great variety of cases, including tainted reasoning and entrenched group-
based bias, such as racism (Mills 2007), where VRPHRQH·V own ignorance is neither chosen or 
engineered in any clear-cut way, nor imposed or endured.  
 
We have already shown how the agency involved in tainted reasoning can be interpreted and 
assessed. An important feature of this model is its rejection of any sharp distinction between moral 
ignorance and ignorance of facts (Heal, forthcoming 2019). Looking at the space of reasons, moral 
and factual considerations are typically intertwined. The patterns of salience picked out by 
individual reasoners are direct manifestations of their own agency, not something they passively 
acquiesce to. This is why the model does not come with a rough and ready rule declaring greater, 
or lesser, ignorance as the more culpable. The shape of ignorance, as it were, is more important.  
 
                                                          
11 For the need to establish both of these dimensions of responsibility in cases of systemic corruption, see Ferretti 
2017; see also Thompson 1980. 
 34 
This acknowledgement does justice to cases, such as tainted reasoning in systemic corruption, 
where some degree of incorrigibility might be involved. After all, the rationalisation it is based on 
is, as we argued, necessarily less-than-successful. This feature, however, does not turn this kind of 
rationalisation into an instance of what Mason (2015) has termed ¶REMHFWLYH· DV RSSRVHG WR
¶RUGLQDU\EODPHZRUWKLQHVV· LW LVDSSURSULDWH WRDVNWDLQWHGUHDVRQHUVIRUDPHQGVDQGWRH[SHFW
them to stand down from the offices they have degraded. In this sense, we can conclude that 
individuals retain moral responsibility in cases of systemic corruption and that the establishment 
of responsibility in this kind of cases can help to track a sui generis kind of epistemically grounded 
blameworthiness. 
 
Notice, also and finally, that the model we offer is not limited to negative moral address. Tainted 
reasoning will occasionally apply to actions, for which at least limited credit is due. Importantly, 
these positive cases might not be appreciated as such by the tainted reasoners themselves. Some 
of them are likely to interpret their unease with current redescriptions as a regrettable inability to 
fit in. Unlike attributability accounts, our acknowledgement of potentially creditable ignorance 
does not rest on a notion of akratic right-doing. Nor does it require a view where practical 
reasoning is just about motivation to act.  
 
On the contrary, that some positive moral address is consistent with agential ignorance flows 
directly from our understanding of reason-giving as the primary object of responsibility 
assessments. Since producing a report rather than spinning a story is what successful reason-giving 
ORRNVOLNHWKHUHZLOOEHSOHQW\RIURRPIRUUHJLVWHULQJVXUSULVHFRQIXVLRQRUGLVEHOLHIDWRQH·VRZQ
actions. And in cases, such as tainted reasoning this might be a salutary thing opening up a breach 
in an otherwise internally sustained practice to inaugurate possibilities for redemption and redress. 
This is new territory to explore. In this paper, we offered the conceptual background and the 
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